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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(j)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The following
Appellate

Court

issues raise questions of law.

reviews questions

of

law

giving no deference to the trial court.

The

for correctness,

Reeves v. Gentile,

813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991).
(a)

Was

Energy

Management

Corporation's

offer

of

lifetime employment until retirement for the rest
of Mr. Luck's career too equivocal and unclear to
be enforced against it as a matter of law because
the offer did not state a specific retirement age
and

did

not

enumerate

specific

resignation or termination?

3

grounds

for

(b) As a matter of law, are there no set of facts
under which termination based on objection to
lawful employment of a member of the terminated
employee's household can invoke the public policy
exception to at-will employment?

DETERMINATIVE LAW

RULE
U.R.C.P. 56
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, the facts are as follows:

Energy

Management

Corporation

offered

Steve

Luck

lifetime employment until retirement for the rest of his
career.
No

No specific retirement age was stated in the offer.

specific

grounds

for

resignation

or termination

were

enumerated.

Steve Luck accepted the offer and both sides performed
under the agreement until Steve Luck's son went to work for a
competitor, at which time Energy Management Corporation fired
4

Steve Luck because it objected to having a member of Steve
Luck's immediate household work for a competitor.

Steve

Luck

brought

this

action

against

Energy

Management Corporation for wrongful termination. In the court
below, Judge Homer Wilkinson stated in open court that while
it might be reversible error to do so, he was granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The offer and acceptance of lifetime employment for
the rest of Mr. Luck's career until retirement was not so
unclear and equivocal as to preclude a trial.

2. The public policy exception to at-will employment
should be extended to protect an employee from termination of
employment based solely or primarily on the conduct of
persons who live in the same household as the employee.

The

right to live with a son is a legal right and could be a public
duty,

bringing

to

bear

two

of

the

three

public

policy

categories noted in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1992) . Termination based on the conduct of another (Mr. Luck's
son) is contrary to the policy behind public

5

employment

statutes which clearly prohibit termination based on outside
factors not related to the merit of the employee, and said
public employment statutes can be referenced as a statement of
public policy applicable to private employment under Peterson
v. Browning, supra.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

THE PARTIES' MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT
FOR THE REST OF MR. LUCK'S CAREER UNTIL RETIREMENT PRECLUDES
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. LUCK.

The trial court stated in open court that while the
court was "not persuaded a hundred percent that this is a
case for summary judgment" (T.13 Line 18) and that the court
might be "making reversible error" (T.13 Line 22) summary
judgment would enter against Mr. Luck anyway.
23).

(T.13 Line

The trial court incorrectly viewed the record in the

light most favorable to the movant instead of correctly
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment and ascertaining what material
facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
U.R.C.P. 56.

The trial court did make reversible error.

6

It was and is Mr. Luck's position that the trial court
was correct in its statement that it might be reversible
error to enter summary judgment, that indeed it was
reversible error to do so, and that the error should indeed
be reversed in a de novo review for correctness on appeal.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Luck, the
facts show that the president of Energy Management Corporation
offered Mr. Luck lifetime employment for the rest of Mr.
Luck's career until retirement, that Mr. Luck accepted the
offer, and that both parties performed under the agreement.
This was sufficient under Utah law to create an oral contract
of continued employment absent just cause to end the
employment. Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc. 844 P.2d 331 (1992).

At the hearing, Mr. Luck's counsel quoted directly from
the deposition testimony of Mr. Luck cited at page three of
defendant's memorandum: "he offered me an increase in
pay, and at the time he offered to—asked me if I would
consider then totally making the commitment to go to them and
work for the rest of my life. And his words were, I don't
want you to quit.

If you're going to work for me, I want you

to stay." (T.5 Line 20).

7

When Mr. Luck's counsel refers to the language
"(w)ould you consider totally making a commitment to go to
work for the rest of your life" (T.7 Line 16) paraphrasing
"he offered to—asked me if I would consider then totally
making the commitment to go to them and work for the
rest of my life" (T.5 Line 21) the court states from the
bench: "(i)t doesn't say that." (T.8 Line 3).

Mr. Luck respectfully argues on appeal that that is
what his sworn deposition testimony says, and that it is
sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact for trial.

Energy Management Corporation argues that the failure of
the parties to generate a specific list of events that would
constitute just cause to terminate the employment, including,
but not limited to, specification of an exact retirement age
or date, rendered the offer and acceptance too equivocal and
unclear to create contractual rights.

The argument is without merit under Utah employment law.
No such specific list is required for deciding the issue of
just cause under Utah law. The just cause issue is routinely
adjudicated without such a list under the statutes and rules
governing unemployment insurance benefits in Utah.

8
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the light most favorable to Mr. Luck's opposition thereto.

Furthermore, Energy Management Corporation has not taken
the position on summary judgment that Mr. Luck retired UJ.

o

that there was other just cause for termination.

Nor has it

filed any affidavit by its officers creating a factual
dispute as to whether the terms of the offer and acceptance
are too unclear and equivocal for its officers to comprehend,
interpret, or apply.

Had it taken such a position, said

issues would require a trial of the facts.

Instead, it

simply took the narrow position that Mr. Luck somehow
remained an at-will employee, regardless of Mr. Luck's
affidavit and deposition testimony to the contrary,
and regardless of Mr. Luck's allegations of record to the
contrary, which Energy Management Corporation never placed
at issue by affidavit or similar opposing documentation,
allowing Mr. Luck's allegations to stand under U.R.C.P. 56.

The at-will issue requires a trial of the facts in
light of the offer, acceptance, and performance under
a contract of lifetime employment until retirement for the
rest of Mr. Luck's career, which must be deemed to exist when
the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, and which preclude summary
judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. Mr. Luck's affidavit and sworn
deposition testimony entered into the record, together with
all of the remaining record from the initial complaint
forward, never opposed by any counter-affidavit or similar
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Clear and substantial public po] icy exceptions to atwill employment must, of necessity, require case-by-case
development „
1992)
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(lit:ah

Tl lis case presents a situation suitable for further
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development of public policy exceptions.

The right to live

with a son is a legal right and could be a public duty,
bringing to bear two of the three public policy categories
noted in Peterson v. Browning, supra.

No public policy consideration in employment is stronger
than the policy of having employees rewarded or punished
based on individual personal merit, and not for the
transgressions of their parents, spouses, siblings, children,
or other members of the employee's household.

The affidavit of Ken Worton has created a factual
dispute as to whether Mr. Luck was fired solely or primarily
because his son had gone to work for a competitor.

The public policy favoring reliance on individual
personal merit in employment matters is expressed in various
ways throughout statutes, constitutions, and case decisions.

For example, in municipal and other public employment
settings, there is a policy to avoid discharge based on
politics, religious belief, or incident to or through changes
in elective officers, governing bodies, or heads of
departments.

See, inter alia, U.C.A. Sec. 10-3-1106.
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\t'\ i cle XII,

Section 19, and "just protection" of the ri ghts of labor ' .
expressly provided for under Article XVI, section 1.

Just and equitable incentives in private employment
based on individual merit rather than race, religion, gender,
1 lati 01 ia] or :i gi 1 1, age

c u id o I::l: ler factor s an e fi r nil y embedded

in constitutional provisions, national, state, and local
statutes aiiv-i ordinances, and J_H dtie cases construing them.

Even the selection of judges I n Utah has moved away from
the old "a ] awyer who knew a governor 11 definition o
to the use of screening panels to consider individual me] -

x
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this case a new public policy exception to at-wil 1
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publi c policy of this state to encourage the use of
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unconscionably disregarded when

1 in I

porsniM I mrril

v..

-vas fired solely or

primarily because of his son's conduct, and this case should

be decided in a way that creates a precedent favoring
use of individual personal merit in employment decisions.

CONCLUSION

The summary judgment should be reversed for a trial on
the offer and acceptance of lifetime employment for the rest
of Mr. Luck's career until retirement and on the firing of
Mr. Luck solely or primarily based on the conduct of his son,
with instruction that such a discharge invokes a public
policy exception to at-will employment.

DATED this

^ ^

day of

!OPIER
Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDA
\

I: i i idings of Fact at id Conclusions of Law.

B

A i "'II ' i' :lc:

C

Affidavit: o f Kei i Worton.
Defendar-

ii It o I ' Ste e I i icl :

memorandum pp. 0-4 (citing to deposition of Steve Luck).

Dale A. Kimball (1809)
Mark E. Wilkey (4167)
Heidi E. C. Leithead (5102)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEVE LUCK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

|
|
|
J

ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, |
Defendant.

!

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 910906921 CV
The Honorable Homer Wilkinson

After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument
thereon, this Court entered an Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
defendant Energy Management Corporation and entering judgment in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff. The grounds for the Court's Order are as follows:
Findings of Fact
1.

Plaintiff Steve Luck ("Luck") was hired as the service manager and special

projects engineer at Energy Management Corporation ("EMC") in July 1990.
2.

EMC terminated Luck's employment in July 1991.

3.

Luck had no written employment contract with EMC. The sole basis alleged for

an employment agreement with EMC was Luck's alleged oral conversations with Mr. Steve
Rossiter ("Rossiter").
4.

In Luck's conversations with Rossiter, Rossiter never agreed to limit the grounds

for which he could terminate Luck. Nor did Rossiter specify any definite term for Luck's
employment.
5.

Luck suggests that both he and Rossiter expressed their optimism and hope that

the employment relationship would last for the rest of his life or until his retirement, but no
clear and unequivocal term was ever articulated. The parties never discussed any specific age
of retirement nor any definite term of employment. Nor did the parties ever discuss the grounds
or circumstances under which Luck could be terminated.
6.

Luck has failed to provide this Court with any provision of any EMC employment

manual or other documents that purports to limit or modify EMC's right to discharge its
employees at-will.
Conclusions of Law
1.

Under Utah law, there is a presumption that all employment relationships are

terminable at will by either party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991).
2.

Under Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1992),

and Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (1992), oral statements can rebut the
at-will presumption only if they are "clear and unequivocal" sufficiently definite to operate as
a contract provision, and clearly communicate the employer's intent to offer employment other
than at-will.

cmcUuck-OiO.chd

2

3.

Plaintiff has failed to present this Court with any clear and unequivocal oral

statements indicating that EMC intended to depart from the presumptive at-will employment
relationship.
4.

Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with any legal support for his claim that

an expression of hope for employment for the rest of his life or until retirement is sufficiently
definite to operate as a contract provision.
5.

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of rebutting the at-will presumption that

exists in Utah.
6.

Plaintiff has failed to establish any basis for his position that he was terminated

in violation of public policy.
7.

There are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude entry of summary

judgment in favor of defendant.
ENTERED this j £ f ^ d a y of March, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Homer Wilkinson
District Court Judge

emc\luck-010.chd
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ROBERT H. COPIER - #727
Attorney for Plaintiff
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0099
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVE LUCK,

|

AFFIDAVIT OF BTEVE LUCK
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION

1

Civil No. C91-6921

1

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

]
Plaintiff,

vs.
ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORP.,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

STEVE LUCK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
1. I am the plaintiff in this action.
2. I have personal knowledge of the discussions that
took place between the plaintiff and defendant in this
action, because I am the plaintiff and I participated in them
with the president of Energy Management Corporation. At no
time before or during my employment did anyone allege that my
employment was at-will. Instead, the president of Energy
Management Corporation and I stated to each other that I
would work for Energy Management Corporation until I retired.

1

3 . 1 have personal knowledge concerning my performance
as an employee, because I personally engaged in such job
performance. The president often told me I was doing a good job
and expressed gratitude that I would be working for him for the
rest of my career. Based on my personal knowledge, said
employment performance was satisfactory, and there was no just
cause to terminate my employment with Energy Management
Corporation.
DATED this

q—

day of February, 1993.

^~~^y

£TEVE LUCK

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public of
the State of Utah, on this the *)**• day of February, 1993.
• rat. cr:< rs» <

• » ' •*>.. ct: t r :

AV^YWy
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ROBERT H. COPIER - #727
Attorney for Plaintiff
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0099
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVE LUCK,

]
AFFIDAVIT OF KEN WORTON
Plaintiff,

]

vs.

;1

ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORP.,

Civil No. C91-6921

I

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss:
)

KEN WORTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
1. I was employed by Energy Management Corporation as
a sales engineer at the time Steve Luck's employment with Energy
Management Corporation was terminated on or about July 9, 1991.
2. On or about July 9, 1991, Steve Rossiter, the
President of Energy Management Corporationf told me, in a
discussion at the company offices that included just the two of
us, that Steve Luckfs employment with the Company had been
terminated, and he concluded the discussion with the statement
that "we just canft have someone working for us who lives with

1

someone working for them." I knew on or about July 9, 1991, that
Steve Luckfs son, who lived with Steve Luck, had recently gone to
work for a competitor.
3. At a later date, I learned that Steve Luck had
asserted a claim for wrongful termination against Energy
Management Corporation. A short time after that, I received an
employment manual amendment stating that employment with the
company was at-will.
DATED this

O

day of February, 1993.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me, this
February, 1993.

My Commission Expires:
~;::—\
5 : c»v: :•.-:.•

til *(£;£•':•'* \-\

ICCCWQ*.

X

day of

/^cTft^AU)^^

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT

uOi|.

S-.V-vwi'rc . i,»T i
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STATE OF UTAH

2

EMC as an independent contractor, Rossiter allegedly approached Luck about becoming a fulltime EMC employee:
Q.

And what did Steve say during that meeting?

A

He offered me an increase in pay, and at the time he offered to - asked me if I
would consider then totally making the commitment to go to them and work for the rest
of my life. And his words were, I don't want you to quit. If you're going to work for
me, I want you to stay.
* * * *

We kind of had a running - not really a joke, but a running statement that was you've
got me for the rest of my life. And he would say you're not going to quit. And I would
say no, you've got me until I retire. And his answer was great, that's the way I want
it. At that time, he made me the service manager and special projects manager.
* * * *

Q.

Did you discuss during that meeting with Steve any circumstances under which you could
resign?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you have any discussion with Steve about circumstances under which you could be
terminated or fired?

A.

No. He emphasized the fact that he didn't want me to quit and leave him high and dry.
I told him at the time, I said in five years I'll be almost 55 years old. That's a poor time
to be out looking for another job.
* * * *

Q.

Did you have any understanding that you could be terminated from EMC?

A.

Not from him. I mean obviously any employee understands that if he messes up or if
the company goes bankrupt or whatever they're not going to be there. I felt very
confident that I would be there quite a while just on the basis of the customers that would
call and ask for my assistance.

e\emc-l027.hcl
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Q.

Okay. So you understood that if your work performance was not satisfactory you could
be terminated?

A.

Sure.

Q.

That was based on your previous work experience or just your subjective —

A.

Common sense.
* * * *

Q

You've indicated both that you had a contract for life and a contract until
retirement. Is there a distinction in your mind between the two?

A.

Well, excuse me. Let me rephrase that. It was my understanding that I had a contract
with Energy Management until the day I retired, which in my mind was 65 years old.

Q.

And when you say a contract for life, what you mean is a contract until you retire at
approximately 65 years of age?

A.

Yes. Sixty-five or 70.

Q.

Did you ever have any discussions with Steve Rossiter or anyone else about the age at
which you would retire?

A.

No.

Luck Depo. at 15-18, 65-66.4
Thus, Luck asserts two bases to support his claims: (1) that he had a contract of
employment with EMC that could only be terminated for cause, see Complaint at K 2, or (2) that
he had a contract of employment until retirement at age 65 or 70, see Luck Depo. at 65-66.

4

Luck also testified that he had never seen any employee bulletins or personnel manuals that
limited EMC's right to discharge its employees. Further, Luck testified that he was not aware
of any termination procedure followed by EMC. Luck Depo. at 37.

e\emc-l027.hcl
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Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 )
Rule 55. Default
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided m
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c)
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985 )
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor upon all or any part thereof
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt
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